

Kerberos, AFS and SSH for your Understanding



Published messages

- Apr 2003 We have installed a ssh v3.6.1p1 with Kerberos5 support on Linux.
- Apr 2003 We have installed a new authentication method (Kerberos5) on Linux.
- May 2003 The complete switch to Kerberos 5.
- Feb 2004 Mail service up again (only SSL or Kerberos Authentication)
- Jun 2004 quota limit for AFS home directories now 500 Mbyte
- Jul 2004 ssh will use protocol version 2 by default.
- Aug 2004 New Linux AFS fileserver. Now we have 15 TByte AFS space.



Why Kerberos 5?

and more about Kerberos 5

Why is AFS our strategy?

and more about AFS

Why SSH Protocol 2?

and more about SSH



Why I put these things together ?

- our concept
- our basics for security
- our goal: Kerberos, AFS and SSH working together



Kerberos Authentication with shared secret

- to authenticate users and services on an unsafe network
- The kerberos server is trusted by all entities on the network, users, hosts and services, so called **principals**.
- All principals share a secret password or key with the kerberos server.
- This enables principals to verify that the messages from the kerberos server are authentic.
- Each Kerberos installation defines an administrative **realm** of control.



- a user first talks to the Authentication Service on the **Key Distribution Center (KDC)** to get a **Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)**.
- When the user wants to talk to a Kerberized service, he uses the TGT to talk to the Ticket Granting Service (on KDC)
- TGS verifies the user's identity using the TGT and issues a **ticket** for the desired service (ssh,imap,AFS,acrontab,...)
- the **AFS token** is a special Kerberos 4 service ticket



- system clocks have to be synchronized
timestamps play an important role during authentication

- expiration of TGT and Tickets for security reasons
lifetime 25 hours



Kerberos Krb5 is better than Krb4

- The key salt algorithm has been changed to use the entire principal name.
- The network protocol has been completely redone (based on ASN.1)
(Abstract Syntax Notation)
- support for forwardable, renewable and postdatable tickets
- Kerberos tickets can now contain multiple IP addresses and addresses for different types of networking protocols.
- A generic crypto interface module is now used, so other encryption algorithms beside DES can be used.
- More flexible cross-realm authentication.
- Pre-authentication

to overcome the ability to do an offline dictionary attack, one weakness of kerberos4



Kerberos kinit and klog

- `kinit -h` shows all options
- `kinit -R` renew TGT for further 25 hours, AFS token too
max renew life time: 30 days
Attention: renewed ticket no longer forwardable
- `kinit -l time` new TGT with specified lifetime, like 1h
- `kinit` initializes the credentials cache
if you have had tickets or tokens of other realms or cells
they are destroyed after kinit
- `klog` is **obsolete**, but can still be used to get an AFS token for
another cell: `klog user@cell`



Kerberos klist and kdestroy

klist shows your tickets and tokens

Format of Kerberos 5 principals:

krbtgt/IFH.DE@IFH.DE

host/pippin.ifh.de@IFH.DE

Format of Kerberos 4 principals:

krbtgt.IFH.DE@IFH.DE

imap.manto@IFH.DE

Format of AFS Token:

afs@IFH.DE

kdestroy destroys tickets and tokens



AFS Andrew Filesystem is distributed network file system

In the 80s developed at CMU; research project with IBM.
Later spun off into Transarc labs, absorbed by IBM;
sold AFS as commercial product.

September 2000 → announcement of OpenAFS

Since then several releases of OpenAFS.



Benefits of AFS

- Global filesystem
- good security with strong authentication
- data replication (readonly)
- data relocation (readwrite, transparent to clients)
- online backups (clone volumes) enable users to recover from rm accidents without admin intervention

Why we don't like to have NFS

- very weak security
everybody should know: **no** truly **private** information in NFS
criminal behaviour can cause data loss
- data relocation is very expensive, needs maintenance time and a lot of communication with users
- a crash or shutdown of an NFS server can cause a lot of hanging clients
maybe in the future: NFS4 better



AFS knows more than traditional UNIX filesystem permissions:

read, write, insert, delete

lookup, lock, administrate

but **only per directory**

(one disadvantage of AFS)

group and other UNIX bits are ignored, but

AFS "respects" the owner UNIX bits:

Only read a file if its UNIX 'r' owner mode bit is 'r'

Only write to a file if its UNIX 'r' and 'w' owner mode bits are not '-'

Only execute a file if its UNIX 'r' and 'x' owner mode bits are not '-'

The owner of the directory always has administrate rights.

Without further ACLs the owner bits are valid for ALL users.



ACLs are lists of pairs: (*who mode*)

who can be a user, a group or a group of IP addresses

mode is a list of bits like ruid

ACLs Examples

system:administrator	ruidwka	(afs admin)
system:anyuser	l	(really world accessible, lookup)
desy-hosts	rl	(141.34.0.0,131.169.0.0)
webserver	rl	
group:amanda	ruidwka	(member of group amanda)

to list ACLs

fs listacls path



to change ACLs

```
fs setacl path who mode [who mode ... who mode]
```

shortcuts:

read rl

write rlidwk

all rlidwka

none -

```
fs sa ~/project group:nuastro read  
readable for group group:nuastro
```

you should **not give others write access to your home directory tree**
better done in group space

RSR statement:

<http://www.desy.de/rsr/intern/rsr-stat-1999-06.html>



Inheritance of ACLs

subdirectories (not mountpoints) inherit the acls of its parents
at creation time

Changing ACLs in a directory tree

```
find dir -type d -noleaf -exec fs setacl { } group:nuastro rl \;  
find dir -type d -noleaf -exec fs copyacl dir1 { } \;
```

ACLs not file based, what to do?

Example: file `.forward`, `.procmailrc`

```
fs la ~/public
```

```
desy-hosts rl
```

```
wwinzig rlidwka
```

```
ls -l .forward : .forward → public/.forward
```

```
ls -l .procmailrc: .procmailrc → public/.procmail
```



to get an AFS token

log in with a password

log in via `ssh` from an other host of our Kerberos domain
on which you have a valid Kerberos5 TGT

(ticket forwarded, new token generated from ticket);

but you do **NOT** get an AFS token using ssh key authentication

unlock the screen (xlock, xscreensaver)

run `kinit`

to check AFS tokens

run `klist`, `tokens`



the client maintains a local cache for performance reasons

- persistent (still available after reboot)
- readwrite
- local changes to a file are flushed to the server after closing it
- after crash of PC or hard RESET the cache can be corrupt and you need a system admin
- in case of cache problems sometimes helps: [fs checkvol](#)



- AFS space is handled in chunks called volumes
- each volume has an associated quota
- a volume need not be mounted
- a volume can have more than one mountpoint
- a volume can have readonly replicas
- a volume can have a backup volume (snapshot) generated last night

`fs listquota dir`

→ you get the quota but also the volume name

`lsmount`

display the mount point(s) for a given *vol_name* or *path*
(generated from nightly cron jobs)

example: `lsmount -t /afs/afh.de/group/pitz`



Naming scheme

/afs/afh.de/user

/afs/afh.de/group

/afs/afh.de/www

/afs/afh.de/@sys/products

home directory

is one volume

one is the snapshot from last night : ~/.OldFiles

more are possible for scratch or www or user defined



<http://www-zeuthen.desy.de/computing/services/AFS/backup.html>

- Nightly snapshot available, but not mounted;
to mount the snapshot:
 - find the afs volume the lost data belongs to:
`fs listquota /afs/.ifh.de/group/mygroup/myproject`
volume name g.mygroup.vol10
 - check the creation time of the backup volume:
`vos exa g.mygroup.vol10`
 - mount the volume:
(you need admin rights (ACL:a))
`fs mkmount /afs/.ifh.de/user/o/otto/mygroup g.mygroup.vol10.backup`
 - remove the mountpoint after you copied the lost files:
`fs rmmount /afs/.ifh.de/user/o/otto/mygroup`



- most volumes with a quota less than 2 Gbyte are in the backup (incremental) and you can recover with `afs_recover`
 - ✓ `afs_recover -date YYYYMMDD`
 - you get a recovered volume mounted in `~/Recover`
 - ✓ copy the wanted files
 - ✓ unmount and delete the recover volume with `afs_remove`



each volume has a quota

list quota with

`fs listquota path`

home directory: max quota: 500 Mbyte

should stay below 90% not to run in trouble

Now we can handle quota for projects with `afs_admin`.

AFS group admins can manage the AFS group space by themselves.



AFS principals (hosts, user and groups) can be members of protection groups.
All unix groups have corresponding PTS groups with the same members.
All PTS groups are owned by the principal *group*.

- to list the member a group of users

`pts membership group:group`

- create your own group with your friends and give them special rights

`pts creategroup wwinzig:myfriends`

`pts adduser friend wwinzig:myfriends`

`pts membership wwinzig:myfriends`

`pts rename wwinzig:myfriends wwinzig:proj_a`

`pts delete wwinzig:proj_a`

`fs setacl ~/project_A wwinzig:proj_a rl`



AFS

sysname

binary type, a per-host property

DESY Linux 5: i586_linux24

Solaris 8: sun4x_58

may be a list as well (SLD3: i586_rhel30 i586_linux24 i386_linux24)

`fs sysname` reports the CPU/operating system type

`livesys`

a path component with `@sys` is automatically resolved to the binary type of the host you are working on.

Example PITZ group using that: `ls -l /afs/ihf.de/group/pitz/doocs/`

used to make binaries and libraries on all platforms with the same path available can only be used in AFS space



AFS and Batchsystem SGEEE (Sun Grid Engine Enterprise Edition)

for job submission you need a valid kerberos 5 ticket

AFS and Cron

special acrontab

<http://www-zeuthen.desy.de/computing/services/AFS/acrontab.html>

Further Notes:

no man pages, but

`fs help;` `fs listacl -help`

`vos help;` `vos exa -help`

`pts help;` `pts exa -help`



The Secure Shell protocol provides four basic security benefits:

- user Authentication
- host Authentication
- data Encryption
- data Integrity

Implementations of Secure Shell offer the following capabilities:

- a secure command-shell
- secure file transfer
- secure X11 forwarding
- remote access to a variety of TCP/IP applications via a secure tunnel



SSH

protocol 1 and 2

SSH Version 1, developed in 1995, is being phased out to replace the non-secure UNIX "r-commands" (rlogin, rsh, and rcp).

In favor of SSH Version 2, 2001 standardized by the IETF's (Internet Engineering Task Force) Secure Shell Working Group, SSH1 is deprecated.

SSH2 has taken its place, but why ?

There are proven cryptographic weaknesses in the protocol:

ssh Insertion Attack (1998)

ssh Compensation Attack (2001/2002)

A lot of security problems in **SSH1** during the last years.



SSH2 is a complete rewrite of the protocol

- separate transport, authentication and connection protocol
- implementation of Diffie-Hellmann key exchange method -
the star of SSH2

Diffie-Hellman is a key agreement protocol, and was developed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. The entire purpose of Diffie-Hellman is to allow two entities to exchange a secret over a public medium without having anything shared beforehand.

- strong cryptographic integrity check
- modular cryptographic and compression algorithms
- no longer server keys needed
- host based authentication not dependend on the network address



OpenSSH supports both SSH1 and SSH2

Why haven't we changed to SSH2 earlier?

- no Kerberos ticket forwarding;
what means no single sign on.
- no Krb4 support
- no AFS support

Now things have changed and we started switching to protocol 2.



SSH

Examples for ssh and scp

```
ssh myname@desthost [command]
scp [host1:]file1 [host2:]file2
scp -r local/work athena.mit.edu:/path/to/remote
scp athena.mit.edu:/path/from/remote/'*.c' local
scp myname@athema.mit.edu:/path/from/remote local
```

xssh desthost

(script adapted by DESY Zeuthen)

to start an ssh in a separate window



SSH

public key authentication

- to generate authentication keys for ssh protocol 2 run
`ssh-keygen -t dsa`
- add the public dsa key to `$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys`

ATTENTION:

With public key authentication you do **NOT** get an AFS token!
If you use X11 forwarding you will run into **timeouts** during login into DESY hosts and have no secure X11 forwarding.

You can use this for passwordless login or copying data into your notebook or home PC.



SSH

Using ssh to DESY without Installing ssh

mindterm - Java applet implementing SSH and a terminal emulator

<https://bastion.desy.de>

If you accept the certificate of the DESY-CA and use the signed applet you can connect directly to systems at DESY Zeuthen.


Overtyping the initial string bastion.desy.de with e.g. pub.ifh.de.



SSH

Secure Port Forwarding (Tunneling)


Port forwarding allows data from normally unsecured TCP/IP applications to be secured



ssh has built-in support for intelligent **X11 forwarding**

If you are running some X clients on the remote system the ssh server is forwarding them to the ssh client which is forwarding them to the X server through the encrypted tunnel.

X11 forwarding switched on by default at DESY.



Secure port forwarding with "**ssh -L**"

You can forward arbitrary connections through your ssh tunnel using the -L option. This makes your ssh client listen on a given port and forward traffic received there through the tunnel;

it instructs the remote sshd to send the traffic to a given IP address and port.

```
ssh -L port:localhost:destport desthost ...
```

```
ssh -L port:desthost:destport remotehost ...
```



Example 1: direct connection to your desktop from outside

```
ssh -l myuserid -L 7777:mydesk.ifh.de:22 pub.ifh.de cat -
```

In a separate window you can use now ssh or scp to connect directly to your internal host through the tunnel. For example:

```
ssh -p 7777 localhost uname -a  
scp -p -P 7777 localhost:data/file1.txt .
```

Example 2: access to DESY internal webpages

```
ssh -L 7777:webserver:80 pub.ifh.de cat -
```

In another window you can use the tunnel

```
ssh -p 7777 localhost  
and start mozilla with http://localhost:7777/
```



Example 1: VNC (Virtual Network Computing) with ssh tunnel

- start on the destination host `vncserver`
`vncserver`
- replace in `~/.vnc/xstartup` `twm` by `startkde` or `fvmw2` or whatever you want
- build an ssh tunnel to the destination host with
`port = 5900 + Display`
`ssh -L port:localhost:port dest`
- now you can start `vncviewer` with the given display on your local host
`vncviewer localhost:display`
- please run `vncserver -kill display` when done
- AFS/Krb credentials are those of the `vncserver` process



- `rsync -rsh="ssh"`
- protecting mysql sessions
- securing cvs by pserver port forwarding



? hanging clients?

~? list of supported escape sequences

~. terminate connection

~^Z suspend ssh

~# list forwarded connections and more ...

? is the kerberos ticket expired?

? are you running into quota? Then .xauth can't be written.

? warnings about wrong ssh keys? danger: man-in-the-middle-attack.

X11 forwarding switched off. If destination host key changed

you have to remove the old key from your `~/.ssh/known_hosts`.

? no idea? debugging with `ssh -vvv`, send the output to `uco@ifh.de`



Thank you for your attention and long patience

Further questions ?

